Foreword by Silliman, Scott L.
FOREWORD
ScoTT L. SILLIMAN*
While normative provisions promulgated with a view toward
prohibiting acts of aggression and violations of humanitarian law have
been the subject of many articles, books and conferences, the same
emphasis seemingly has not been given to the question of the
enforcement of these normative provisions. The Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law seeks to do just that in this special
Symposium on the Enforcement of Humanitarian Law.
This year heralds the 50th anniversary not only of the United
Nations, but also the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
which convened at the close of World War II. This ad hoc tribunal,
comprised of representatives of the four victorious powers, weighed
the evidence presented as against charges of crimes against peace, war
crimes and crimes against humanity.' It thereafter rendered judgment
upon twenty-two German war criminals, sentencing twelve to death,
seven to varying terms of imprisonment, and acquitting three.' More
importantly, with respect to violations of international humanitarian
law, this first international tribunal established a precedent of
accountability to the rule of law.3 Notwithstanding worldwide
acceptance of the Nuremberg Principles,4 the international community
went for a period of almost five decades without any further attempts
to bring to justice those who committed violations of the Geneva
Conventions or the laws of war, although such violations were clearly
documented in conflicts in Korea, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
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1. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
2. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 587-99 (1992)
3. "That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the
most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to reason .. " Robert H. Jackson, American
Chief Counsel for the Prosecution (and Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court), in his
opening statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on November 20, 1945.
4. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg., at 485, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
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On May 25, 1993, prompted by widely publicized accounts of
atrocities committed by the warring factions in the Balkans, the
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 827 establishing
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. As of the
time of this writing, the Tribunal has indicted over fifty suspects,
including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military
chief, General Ratko Mladic, yet only one trial has commenced-that
of Bosnian Serb Dusan Tadic who is already in the Tribunal's
custody.6
This ad hoc Tribunal, although limited in jurisdiction to certain
specified offenses7 which have occurred in the Former Yugoslavia
5. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). A
second ad hoc tribunal, with jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens responsible for such crimes in
neighboring states, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, was established by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 955 on November 8,1994. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 955 (1994). The Statute for the Rwanda Tribunal specifies
that the Prosecutor and the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia shall serve both tribunals.
6. Tadic was originally arrested in February of 1994 and held in Germany pending an
investigation being conducted by the Germans regarding allegations of crimes committed in the
Former Yugoslavia. In the Fall of that year, the Tribunal formally requested that Germany defer
to its primacy with regard to further criminal proceedings against Tadic, and on March 31, 1995,
the German Parliament passed legislation in which it agreed to cooperate with the Tribunal.
Tadic was moved from Germany to a jail at the Tribunal's seat at the Hague on April 24, 1995,
and thereafter had his initial appearance before Trial Chamber II. He moved to challenge the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the grounds that it had an illegal foundation, that there was
wrongful primacy over national courts, and that there was a lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae.
On August 10, 1995, Trial Chamber II denied Tadic's motion challenging the Tribunal's
jurisdiction and, four days later, he filed notice of appeal alleging an error of law. On October
2, 1995, the Tribunal's five member Appeals Chamber, by votes of four to one in an extremely
convoluted opinion, affirmed the lower chamber and decided (1) that the Tribunal was
empowered to rule on a challenge to its own jurisdiction, (2) that Tadic's plea was to be
dismissed, (3) that the challenge to the primacy of the International Tribunal over national courts
was also to be dismissed, and (4) that the Tribunal had subject-matter jurisdiction over Tadic's
case. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, International Criminal Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (1995).
7. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Statute
of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, arts. 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). It
should be noted that the jurisdictional articles of the Tribunal's Statute do not contain any
reference to crimes against peace, which were a highly controversial part of the Nuremberg
Tribunal's Charter.
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since January 1, 1991, represents the first international effort since
World War II to bring to justice those who have violated international
criminal law. It differs significantly from what occurred fifty years ago
in that the Nuremberg Tribunal was chartered only by the four
victorious powers of World War II, while the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is empowered by the United
Nations, representing ostensibly the entire international community.
Further, the Tribunal is forbidden from having trials in absentia (as
was done in the Nuremberg case of Martin Bormann), and is limited
in its sentencing to life imprisonment! More significantly, the
Tribunal does not have an independent power of arrest, and must rely
on states to cooperate as far as the apprehension, detention and
ultimate surrender to the Tribunal of persons indicted.'
A pivotal question regarding the Tribunal is whether its authority
and credibility will survive in the context of an international quest for
peace in the Balkans. If given the choice between brokering a lasting
peace, which may depend upon the cooperation of those same
individuals which the Tribunal has indicted or may in the future indict,
will the international community opt for strict enforcement of the rule
of law or the possible chance for a peaceful settlement? Or can both
be accommodated? The answer to that question may come soon now
that a peace agreement has been initialed in Dayton, Ohio, between
Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Franco Tudjman of Croatia, and Alija
Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the agreement calls
for all parties to cooperate with the Tribunal, it remains to be seen
whether Karadzic, Mladic and other high-ranking Serbs will be
surrendered to the Tribunal.
The inherent limitations and problems associated with an ad hoc
tribunal beg the question of whether the international community
would be served better with the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court, ° as has been often suggested. Much
concerning this concept remains to be resolved and agreed to,
especially regarding the crimes over which such a permanent court
8. Id. arts. 21(4)(d), 24. Article 24, after establishing imprisonment as the maximum
punishment available to the Tribunal, goes on to state that "in determining the terms of
imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia."
9. Id. art. 29.
10. See generally United Nations International Law Commission: Report of the Working
Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, July 16, 1993, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 253 (1994).
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would have jurisdiction, but it remains the hope of many who see in
it a firm and lasting commitment to the rule of law that would not and
could not be swayed by the international politics of the moment.
In the pages of the Journal, you will find a discussion of these and
many other issues respecting the enforcement of international
humanitarian law. The articles are drawn from papers presented at
two separate conferences which were co-sponsored by the Center on
Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law,
and the Center for National Security Law at the University of
Virginia. The first conference, entitled "Deterring Humanitarian Law
Violations: Strengthening Enforcement," was held in Charlottesville,
Virginia, on November 4-5, 1994, while the second, entitled "Strength-
ening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law", was held in Durham,
North Carolina, on March 10-11, 1995. We believe the articles
contained herein represent a significant contribution to the literature
in this extremely important area of the law.
